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A CANADIAN LENS ON THIRD PARTY LITIGATION FUNDING 
IN THE AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY CONTEXT
STEPHANIE BEN-ISHAI* & EMILY UZA**
I. INTRODUCTION
Third party litigation funding (“TPLF”) has been described as “the pro-
cess through which the inherent value of a legal claim is used to secure fi-
nancing.”1 In more practical terms, TPLF is the phrase used to describe the 
financing of litigation by specialized parties (“litigation funders”) who are 
not party to the litigation being funded. The five common characteristics of
litigation funding agreements are as follows: (1) a cash advance, (2) made 
by a non-party to the litigation, (3) in exchange for a share of the litigation 
proceedings, (4) whether in settlement, judgment or award, and (5) payable 
at the time of recovery if, and only if, recovery by the funded litigant occurs.2
The fifth criteria listed above is a key feature of TPLF; the non-recourse na-
ture of TPLF distinguishes it from other forms of financing where the litigant 
may be required to repay the advanced funds whether it is successful in its 
litigation proceedings or not.
While TPLF may be most commonly known for its use in the class ac-
tion contexts, it has become increasingly prominent in Australia and, more 
recently, in Canada in the commercial litigation context where contingency 
arrangements are far less common and available.3 In Australia, where con-
tingency fee arrangements are not permitted, the use of TPLF has become 
* Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law School. The authors gratefully acknowledge the excellent research 
assistance provided by Katrina Brazzell and Sayjon Ariyarathnam. We are also grateful for comments 
from Christoph Henkel and the other participants at the Chicago-Kent Law Review Comparative and 
Cross-Border Issues in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Law Symposium.
** Associate, Davies LLP.
1. David R. Glickman, Embracing Third-Party Litigation Finance, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1043, 
1043 (2016).
2. Bernardo M. Cremades, Jr, Usury and Other Defenses in U.S. Litigation Finance, 23 KAN. J.L.
& PUB. POL’Y 151, 152 (2013).
3. Yamri Taddese, Aussie Litigation Funding Company Comes to Canada, LAW TIMES, Mar. 14, 
2016, at 9.
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quite prevalent over the last fifteen years as a general matter and, particu-
larly, in the insolvency context.4 The most common use for TPLF in the in-
solvency context is for avoidance actions as well as other claims held by the 
estate that are too costly to pursue, for example: commercial and intellectual 
property claims, breach of fiduciary duty claims, theft of corporate opportu-
nities, equitable subordination type claims, and tax refunds. TPLF holds the 
potential to increase the size of the estate of an insolvent debtor and thereby 
offers the opportunity for a larger, or any return, to unsecured and other 
lower-ranked creditors.
Despite TPLF’s growing popularity in other common law jurisdictions, 
TPLF has not become as popular in the United States. This Article will ex-
plore TPLF’s lack of adoption in the United States and examine the rationale
for the absence of this funding model with a particular focus on the insol-
vency context. Part II of this Article first provides a discussion of the legal 
barriers to the adoption of TPLF in the United States, as well as a discussion 
of the recent origins of TPLF in the United States, including a discussion of 
its current place in the American legal landscape and the bankruptcy context. 
Part III then discusses the benefits of TPLF, while Part IV addresses some of 
the legal and ethical concerns with TPLF which may be driving the Ameri-
can market’s slow adoption of TPLF. Finally, Part V provides a discussion 
of some of the options for regulation of the TPLF industry in an American
context.
II. LEGAL BARRIERS TO AND ORIGINS OF TPLF IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. Doctrines of Maintenance and Champerty
A variety of factors impact TPLF’s limited use in the United States until 
now, but the historical origins provide the first insight into its limited adop-
tion. The TPLF industry has been impacted by the common law legal doc-
trines of maintenance and champerty. Generally speaking, maintenance is 
the helping of another to prosecute a suit, while champerty is the maintaining 
of a suit in return for the financial interest in the outcome.5 Today, these 
doctrines are used nearly synonymously.6
TPLF falls squarely within these doctrines; a litigation funder helps a 
litigant prosecute a suit (through the provision of funds) in return for a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of such suit (a portion of the award or settlement). 
4. Id.
5. Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 789 N.E.2d 217, 219 (Ohio 2003).
6. Glickman, supra note 1, at 1052.
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Another concept that falls directly within these doctrines is contingency fee
arrangements; a lawyer helps his or her client litigate a case (through the 
provision of legal services on a fee and cost-free basis) in return for a finan-
cial interest in the outcome of such case (a portion of the award or settle-
ment).7 Contingency fee arrangements are permitted in all states. However, 
the treatment of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty have not been 
universal across the states, causing uncertainty in the TPLF industry.8 The
District of Columbia and twenty-seven states explicitly permit champerty 
with varying exceptions; sixteen of those states explicitly allow the invest-
ment by contract into a stranger’s litigation proceedings as a permissible 
form of maintenance.9 In other states, however, the doctrine of champerty 
still continues to have an impact; at least three state courts of appeals cited 
or suggested it as a viable defence in 2016–2017, with a U.S. bankruptcy 
court finding an agreement to be champertous as recently as January 2017.10
In a 2016 New York Court of Appeals decision,11 the court affirmed the 
relevance of the doctrine of champerty in New York. The court broadly de-
fined champerty as “the purchase of notes, securities, or other instruments or 
claims with the intent . . . for the primary purpose of bringing a lawsuit.”12
While this appears threatening to litigation funders, the court confirmed that 
New York legislation creates a safe harbour from the champerty prohibition 
where the purchaser has a binding and bona fide obligation to pay at least 
$500,000.13 The purchaser in Justinian was found not to qualify for the safe 
harbour because it intended to pay off its $1 million obligation from the pro-
ceeds of the litigation.14 However, TPLF in the traditional sense would have 
qualified for the safe harbour, provided the litigation funder was funding in 
excess of $500,000.
7. Jasminka Kalajdzic et al., Justice for Profit: A Comparative Analysis of Australian, Canadian 
and U.S. Third Party Litigation Funding, 61 AM. J. COMP. L. 93, 135 (2013).
8. Id.
9. Karen Rubin, Bring Third-Party Funders out of “The Shadows,” U.S. Chamber Asks Federal 
Rules Committee, THOMPSON HINE LLP: THE LAW FOR LAWYERS TODAY (June 15, 2017), 
http://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/2017/06/3347/ [https://perma.cc/8JGT-SCHE].
10. Id.; see also In re DesignLine Corp., 565 B.R. 341 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2017).
11. Justinian Capital SPC v WestLB AG, 65 N.E.3d 1253 (N.Y. 2016).
12. Id. at 163; see also Alison Frankel, New York’s Top Court Clamps Down on Shoestring Litiga-
tion Funders, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2016, 3:50 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-frankel-litigation-
idUSKCN12S2M3 [https://perma.cc/TYS2-UAQN].
13. Justinian, 65 N.E.3d at 1257–59; see also Frankel, supra note 12.
14. Justinian, 65 N.E.3d at 1259; see also Frankel, supra note 12.
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The Delaware Superior Court has also considered the doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty in the litigation funding context. In Charge In-
jection v. DuPont,15 the defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s action on 
the basis that the plaintiff’s litigation funding arrangement violated Dela-
ware’s prohibition against maintenance and champerty.16 More specifically, 
the defendant argued that the litigation funding arrangement was champer-
tous because the litigation funder, a disinterested third party, had de facto
control over the litigation. However, the court noted that the litigation fund-
ing agreement expressly noted that the litigation funder lacks “any rights as 
to the direction, control, settlement, or other conduct” of the litigation.17
With respect to the defendant’s argument that the litigation funding arrange-
ment violated the doctrine of maintenance, the court held that the litigation 
funder did not “stir up” the litigation or control or force the plaintiff to pursue 
the litigation, but rather, the litigation funder provided the plaintiff with 
funds to pursue a claim which the plaintiff was already committed to liti-
gate.18 The court cited several facts to support this decision:
the plaintiff pursued the litigation despite previously being un-
able to procure TPLF in 2008;
the plaintiff sought TPLF because it did not believe it had the 
capital to pursue long litigation against a defendant with bil-
lions of dollars at its disposal; and
the litigation funding agreement was freely negotiated and it 
did not give the litigation funder any control over the litiga-
tion.19
It is encouraging to see that two states in which commercial activity is 
heavily focused, Delaware and New York, have adopted favourable stances 
on the application of the doctrines of maintenance and champerty that allow 
for the existence of TPLF under the proper circumstances. However, the 
patchwork of application of these doctrines across various states makes nav-
igating the American legal landscape as a litigation funder challenging and
uncertain.
15. Charge Injection Techs. v. E.I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., No. N07C-12-134-JRJ, 2016 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 118 (Mar. 9, 2016).
16. Id. at *1.
17. Benjamin P. Chapple et al., Delaware Court Approves Litigation Funding Agreement, REED 
SMITH LLP (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/2016/03/delaware-court-ap-
proves-litigation- funding-agreeme [https://perma.cc/YXP3-FPE3]; see also Charge Injection, 2016 Del. 
Super. LEXIS 118, at *12.
18. Charge Injection, 2016 Del. Super. LEXIS 118, at *13.
19. Id. at *13–16.
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B. Privilege and Confidentiality
The adoption of TPLF in the United States is also impacted by uncer-
tainty regarding the maintenance of privilege. Before a litigation funder in-
vests in a claim, it will generally require the potential litigant and the
litigant’s counsel to share details of the case so that the litigation funder 
can conduct a due diligence process and evaluate the merits of the litigant’s 
claim.20 However, the loss of privilege can be catastrophic to a litigant’s case 
and thus the litigant and its legal team must ensure that privilege is main-
tained. Unfortunately, while there appear to have been trends towards the 
protection of the information disclosed to litigation funders through attorney 
work privilege, there is still uncertainty; when it comes to maintaining priv-
ilege in high stakes litigation, nothing but certainty is acceptable.
This issue has been considered by courts in Delaware. In Leader,21 the 
U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware upheld an earlier order re-
quiring that the common interest doctrine did not apply to information shared 
by Leader pursuant to TPLF arrangements and that privileged documents 
should be disclosed. The court noted that for a communication to be pro-
tected, the interests must be “identical, not similar, and be legal, not solely 
commercial.”22 The judge who rendered the order conducted a survey of
cases suggesting differing views on the issue, factored in that Leader had 
the burden of establishing the existence of privilege, considered the numer-
ous policy considerations, including the need for litigation funding compa-
nies and the truth-seeking function of litigation, and noted that the case at 
hand presented a close question.23 However, the court in Leader found no 
grounds to overturn the order.
The same issue was considered by the Delaware Court of Chancery five 
years later in Carlyle.24 This time, the result was different; the court found 
in favour of maintaining work product privilege. The court noted that a liti-
gation funder’s decision to fund a case is based on the merits of the case. 
Thus, the litigation funder’s communications with the litigant and the liti-
gant’s legal team are likely to contain the “‘lawyer’s mental impressions, 
theories and strategies about’ the case, which ‘were only prepared ‘because 
20. See Ranjan K. Agarwal & Doug Fenton, Beyond Access to Justice: Litigation Funding Agree-
ments Outside the Class Actions Context, 59 CAN. BUS. L.J. 65 (2017).
21. Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373 (D. Del. 2010).
22. Id. at 376 (quoting In re Regents of Univ. of Cal., 101 F.3d 1386, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
23. Id.
24. Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A., No. 7841-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 42 
(Feb. 24, 2015).
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of’ the litigation.’”25 In addition, the court stated that it saw no persuasive 
reason “why litigants should lose work product protection simply because 
they lack the financial means to press their claims on their own dime.”26 This 
appears to be an acknowledgement by the court of the access to justice ben-
efits of TPLF.
The same result was true in Miller,27 a U.S. District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois decision. Upon determining that the litigation funding 
agreement did not violate the doctrines of maintenance and champerty be-
cause it did not constitute “officious meddling,” the court ruled that, while 
disclosure to litigation funders waived attorney–client privilege, work prod-
uct privilege was not waived so long as the litigant had a reasonable expec-
tation of confidentiality with the litigation funder.28 A non-disclosure
agreement between the litigant and the funder created a reasonable expecta-
tion of confidentiality, although the court did note, but did not discuss, that 
a reasonable expectation of confidentiality may exist even in the absence of 
a non-disclosure agreement.29 This case suggests that litigants and litigation 
funders ought to enter into non-disclosure agreements to further protect 
against attacks on work product privilege.
C. Current Use of TPLF in the United States
The bulk of TPLF in the United States has been focused in the areas of 
patent infringement and price fixing/antitrust. It is no surprise that these are 
the arenas in which litigation funders tend to operate as these are the types 
of cases that typically favour plaintiffs.30 In the intellectual property context, 
the use of TPLF has developed as an alternative to the use of patent “trolls” 
or non-practicing entities (“NPEs”). NPEs purchase patents for the purpose 
litigating potential infringements of the patent.31 However, through the use 
of TPLF, the owner of a patent can partially monetize the patent by agreeing 
to give away a portion of the award or settlement in exchange for funding 
instead of having to fully monetize and lose its rights to the patent.32 There 
25. Id. at *28 (quoting Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 735 (N.D. Ill. 2014)).
26. Id. at *30–31.
27. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d 711.
28. Id. at 735–38.
29. Id. at 738.
30. Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON. &
POL’Y 593, 595 (2012).
31. STEVEN GARBER, ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCE IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES,
KNOWNS, AND UNKNOWNS 37 (RAND Corp., Occasional Paper Ser. No. OP-306-LFCMP, 2010), 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP306.html [https://perma.cc/GFP8-DZZ2].
32. Id.
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are also two major reasons why patent infringement cases are attractive to 
funders. Firstly, such cases are very costly to defend and the majority of costs 
are borne by the defendant, who has higher discovery burdens;33 this means 
that a lower percentage of the award or settlement than is typical goes toward 
the payment of costs. Secondly, patent infringement cases can have signifi-
cant award or settlement amounts as defendants often have to pay reasonable 
royalties or treble damages for wilful infringement.34 Together, these factors 
mean that patent infringement cases are particularly attractive to litigation 
funders as they create the potential for a higher award than the average case 
and give the plaintiff a large amount of bargaining power.35
Price fixing and antitrust is another legal landscape in which litigation 
funders are operating in the United States. There are a number of factors that 
make the use of TPLF in price fixing and antitrust litigation not just attractive 
for litigation funders but also practical for plaintiffs:
there is potential for a high damages award, including auto-
matic treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Antitrust 
Act, and reasonable attorneys’ fees;36
the defendants are jointly and severally liable and do not have 
the right to contribution from co-conspirators;37
there is the potential for an extended limitations period;38
due to the complexity of the cases, the plaintiffs tend to be well-
represented by sophisticated legal teams;39
the cases generally settle;40
there are significant up-front costs which increases the need for 
funding; and41
the defendants are typically credit-worthy,42 thus reducing the 
plaintiff’s and litigation funder’s credit risk.
33. Shepherd, supra note 30, at 602, 605.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 602–03.
36. Id. at 605.
37. Id. at 605–06.
38. Id. at 606.
39. Anne Rodgers et al., Emerging Issues in Third-Party Litigation Funding: What Antitrust Law-
yers Need to Know, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Dec. 2016, art. 2, at 1, https://www.americanbar.org/con-
tent/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/dec16_full_source.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZH3A-
Z6JK].
40. Id. at 2.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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In the American bankruptcy context, however, TPLF has not attracted 
significant attention.43 Instead, distressed debt financing has provided the 
necessary liquidity to distressed estates. Distressed debt financing occurs 
when an investor purchases the debt of a distressed corporation rather than 
just an interest in the outcome of the litigation.44 However, the benefits of 
TPLF were exemplified in the recent bankruptcy proceedings of Magnesium 
Corporation of America (“MagCorp”), rumoured to be the first time a bank-
ruptcy trustee has auctioned off a piece of a litigation judgment via an open 
proceeding overseen by a federal bankruptcy judge.45 The basic facts of the 
MagCorp case are as follows: MagCorp filed for bankruptcy and its bank-
ruptcy trustee commenced a lengthy legal battle against billionaire Ira Ren-
nert and The Renco Group (who almost wholly owned MagCorp’s parent 
company) for their involvement in the diversion of MagCorp’s value.46 The 
trustee obtained a favourable judgment of $213 million, but that judgment 
was appealed by Rennert. A favourable judgment, and thus a successful re-
sult in the appeal, was the only hope of recovery for MagCorp’s unsecured 
creditors.47 However, while the trustee was confident that the judgment 
would stand on appeal, it was concerned about the liquidity of the estate and 
its ability to pay for the costs of the appeal.
To fund the litigation, the MagCorp trustee sold an interest in the liti-
gation; this was done pursuant to section 363(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
which permits a trustee to sell the assets of the debtor corporation outside of
the ordinary course.48 Ultimately, a $50 million interest in the litigation 
was sold for $26.2 million at an auction split between two bidders, AEM 
SPV, LLC (“AEM”) and Brickell Key Investments, LP (an affiliate of litiga-
tion funder Juridica Asset Management).49 When the appeal court affirmed 
the $213 million judgment, not only did the litigation funders nearly double 
their investments, but the trustee was able to fulfill its duties to the creditors 
43. See Stuart L. Pardau, Alternative Litigation Financing: Perils and Opportunities, 12 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 65, 80 (2011).
44. See Frankel, supra note 12.
45. See Ryan Boysen, MagCorp Attys Insist on $88M Legal Bill for Renco Suit Win, Law360 (Jan. 




48. See In re Magnesium Corp. of Am., Ch. 7 Case No. 01-14312 (MKV) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. filed 
Aug. 24, 2016); see also 11 U.S.C. § 363(b) (2012).
49. Id., slip op. at 4–5.
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of the debtor company by monetizing some of the award to maximize recov-
ery for the creditors.50 Although MagCorp is not identical to litigation fund-
ing in that an interest in the litigation proceedings was purchased, the 
fundamental characteristics to TPLF are effectively similar: non-parties to 
the litigation made a cash investment in hopes that they would receive a por-
tion of the successful award, settlement or judgment knowing that if the pro-
ceedings were unsuccessful, they would lose their investments.
III. BENEFITS OF TPLF
A persuasive argument in favour of TPLF encompasses the access to 
justice benefit provided those litigants who may otherwise be unable to pur-
sue meritorious litigation. TPLF levels the playing field between litigants to 
ensure that a plaintiff is not discouraged from pursuing meritorious litigation 
as a result of the immense resources of its opponent. Although contingency 
fee arrangements are available to some litigants to achieve these goals, TPLF 
bridges the gap where a contingency fee arrangement may not be available 
to a litigant.
The access to justice benefit is particularly persuasive in the insolvency 
context where the litigants are in a unique financial position. When a com-
pany is insolvent, it has limited funds available in order to pursue claims. 
The company may have access to debtor-in-possession financing, but such 
financing is typically earmarked for the debtor’s working capital require-
ments. However, TPLF may allow the trustee or unsecured creditors com-
mittee to move forward with a claim that it otherwise would not have been 
able to pursue to maximize the return on the debtor’s estate, to the benefit of 
the debtor company, its unsecured creditors and other stakeholders who ben-
efit from the resolution of the claim.
TPLF possesses the potential to reduce litigation costs incurred. In some 
situations, some litigation funders require lawyers to work on a budget or 
maintain supervisory rights to discourage inflated litigation costs.51 Litiga-
tion funder oversight and case management, then, is a means to mitigate ex-
cessive allocations of resources which ultimately lead to litigation costs 
spiralling out of control. Both the litigation funder and the successful litigant 
benefit in this situation as the ultimate settlement is reduced by a relatively 
lesser amount of costs. In the insolvency context, TPLF has the potential to 
50. See Boysen, supra note 45.
51. Stephanie Ben-Ishai & Emily Uza, Third-Party Litigation Funding in the Canadian Insolvency 
Context, 6 J. INSOLVENCY INST. CAN. 1, 7 (2017).
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be hugely beneficial as large-scale insolvency proceedings have been criti-
cized for immense legal costs which result in a reduction of the proceeds 
available to be paid to the debtors’ creditors. With oversight from litigation 
funders, scope to reduce overall legal expenses exist.
Similarly, TPLF may expedite litigation proceedings as a function of 
funder supervision. This is particularly important in insolvency proceedings 
as the passage of time increases DIP financing costs, the depreciation of the 
debtor’s assets to be distributed to creditors, and ancillary and legal costs 
which deplete the debtor’s estate to the detriment of creditors. The expedi-
tious resolution of insolvency proceedings benefits vulnerable, unsecured 
creditors (such as, for example, pensioners, bondholders or unpaid suppliers) 
who typically have to wait until the finalization of insolvency proceedings 
before receiving a piece of the debtor’s estate.52
Concerns surrounding access to justice are also addressed through the 
use of TPLF as it enables firms to expand the scope of contingency fee ar-
rangements to allow firms to assume more risk. In sharing the risk of funding 
legal expenses with litigation funders, a greater portion of the population 
benefits by ensuring their case gets its day in court. Increased accessibility 
to counsel by way of TPLF, particularly in the insolvency context, ensures 
that the litigant possesses sufficient funds to pay legal expenses.53 TPLF can 
help insolvency practitioners such as trustees and receivers fulfil their duties
to ensure that the debtor’s estate is maximized. Although a portion of any 
settlement or award is ultimately paid to the litigation funder, the debtor’s 
estate still comes out ahead because without the funding, the claim would 
have been left unpursued.54 While a host of benefits accompany TPLF in the 
United States, legal and ethical concerns regarding its usage remain.
IV. LEGAL AND ETHICAL CONCERNS WITH THE USE OF TPLF
Attitudes toward TPLF in the United States appear more negative rela-
tive to other common law jurisdictions such as Australia and Canada. As 
previously discussed, there is concern in the United States that TPLF can 
present issues with the maintenance of privilege. The maintenance of privi-
lege is absolutely critical to a plaintiff’s case and the loss of privilege can be 
hugely detrimental to a plaintiff’s chances of success. As the case law dis-
cussed above indicates, although there is a trend toward the protection of 
52. Id.
53. Khalid Karim & Scott R. Venton, The New Frontier: Commercial Third-Party Litigation Fund-
ing, JUST (Aug. 17, 2016), http://www.oba.org/JUST/Archives_List/2016/August-2016/Sample-(6) 
[https://perma.cc/6C3N-2D9H]; Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 6.
54. Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 7.
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work product and information shared between litigants and litigation fun-
ders, some uncertainty still lingers.
One ethical concern of TPLF highlighted by the Institute for Legal Re-
form is that it can subvert the litigant’s and lawyer’s control over the litiga-
tion.55 The goal of litigation should be to seek justice for the litigants, not 
litigation funders. Further, while a litigation funder may not intentionally al-
ter the course of litigation, the mere appearance of doing so is problematic.56
This power imbalance and the ability, or appearance of the ability, of litiga-
tion funders to control the course of the litigation, however, would be less 
prominent in the commercial insolvency and the involved on all sides. Fur-
ther, as per case law on the doctrines of maintenance and champerty, the 
involvement of the litigation funder in or control of the litigation funder over 
the litigation bears potential to negate the funding arrangement on the basis 
of the violation of such doctrines. The current case law disincentivizes be-
haviour, such as extraneous control, by litigation funders.
Similarly, some have expressed concern that, due to their monetary ra-
ther than justice-driven goals, litigation funders may pressure litigants to set-
tle even when not in the litigant’s best interest. The concern of litigation 
funders exercising control over litigation remains prevalent despite being ad-
dressed in case law. However, if such concern is not mitigated as expected, 
an increase in the number of settlements has both positive and negative im-
pacts on the legal system as a whole. On a positive note, increased settlement 
reduces the burden on an already-crowded court system and can result in the 
more expeditious resolution of cases. However, the negative effects of in-
creased settlement are that it will lead to less case law and precedent over
time and could result in a less public and transparent litigation process,57
which may be particularly detrimental in cases that are of public interest or 
importance. Ethical concerns surrounding TPLF with respect to settlement 
still persist despite clear direction by courts.
Some American commentators have argued that TPLF is “harmful to 
an already flawed legal system, which will encourage unmeritorious and ex-
cessive litigation.”58 The United States is certainly considered to be a more 
55. JOHN H. BEISNER & GARY A. RUBIN, U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, STOPPING THE 
SALE ON LAWSUITS: A PROPOSAL TO REGULATE THIRD-PARTY INVESTMENT IN LITIGATION 1 (2012), 
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/TPLF_Solutions.pdf [https://perma.cc/J77G-
5EGG].
56. Taddese, supra note 3; Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 8.
57. Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 8.
58. Cento Veljanovski, Third-Party Litigation Funding in Europe, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 405, 445 
(2012).
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litigious jurisdiction than Australia or Canada, and one can see why oppo-
nents of TPLF would not want to see the courts even more crowded with 
increased litigation. However, it is integral to note that litigation funders con-
duct an analysis of the merits of a case before agreeing to fund, therefore 
decreasing the likelihood of increased TPLF resulting in an uptick of unmer-
itorious claims. The concern regarding the encouragement of excessive liti-
gation, however, is valid. TPLF opens up litigation possibilities for those
formerly unable to litigate, and the result of this is the potential for an
increased amount of litigation. There is an inherent trade-off between this 
criticism and the access to justice benefit of TPLF. While TPLF has the po-
tential to increase crowding in an already-busy court system, it also has the 
potential to provide access to justice to litigants.
The TPLF industry also creates some consumer protection concerns due 
to the lack of regulation of litigation funders. Without regulation, litigants 
cannot be assured of the reputation, financial position, or solvency of litiga-
tion funders on whom they are relying for funding. This concern is two-fold. 
First, it would be devastating for a litigant to be in the middle of litigation 
proceedings only to find out that their litigation funder is no longer capable 
of providing funds. Secondly, but less importantly in the American context 
where parties tend to pay their own costs, if the litigant is unsuccessful in the 
litigation, the litigant may be liable for costs which the litigation funder 
would typically be responsible for paying. If the litigation funder is not ca-
pable of paying the costs, the litigant would be responsible for a costs order 
that it never contemplated having to pay. The potential regulation of litiga-
tion funders is a necessary next step and is discussed at a later point in this
Article.
Further, selective treatment by litigation funders emphasizes business 
interests, i.e., more lucrative claims, thus resulting in the tendency to ignore 
less lucrative, but equally as meritorious, claims.59 Because litigation funders 
are repaid a percentage of the resolution sum but presumably have fairly
fixed operating costs, it is more economical for litigation funders to fund
larger claims, leaving litigants with smaller claims, and in turn smaller scope 
for compensation, without funding. Although we recognize that TPLF is a 
business, this has ethical implications in the insolvency context as it could 
result in the funding of the larger claims of some unsecured creditors with 
the smaller claims of other unsecured creditors being ignored. This is partic-
ularly problematic if unsecured creditors with smaller claims are the more 
59. Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 8.
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vulnerable and less powerful creditors, such as smaller suppliers, employees 
or tort victims.
V. REGULATION AND OVERSIGHT OF TPLF
In Australia, litigation funders operate virtually unregulated. Early case 
law imposing regulatory burdens on litigation funders was overruled by both
legislation and case law from upper courts. Calls to implement licensing re-
quirements for litigation funders have gone unanswered. The Australian gov-
ernment has made it clear that the access to justice benefit of TPLF is 
paramount and it appears unwilling to introduce any measures that would 
decrease the availability of TPLF, particularly in a jurisdiction where con-
tingency fee arrangements are not permitted.60 In the Australian insolvency 
context, courts play a role in the approval of litigation funding arrangements 
as they are required to approve any contract that will involve performance 
over a term of more than three months, resulting in approval being required 
for almost every litigation funding agreement.
In Canada, TPLF is a fairly new phenomenon. As in Australia, TPLF in 
Canada has carried on relatively unburdened by regulation, although in Can-
ada this appears to be a result of the failure governments to turn their minds 
to this issue rather than an explicit decision not to regulate TPLF, as is the 
case in Australia. We have previously advocated for the regulation of litiga-
tion funders or litigation funding agreements in the Canadian context.61
Canadian courts’ treatment of litigation funding agreements has devel-
oped over a series of cases commencing with the decision in Dugal v Manu-
life Financial Corporation.62 In a recent case, Houle,63 Bentham IMF Capital 
Inc. (“Bentham”) was engaged by the representative plaintiffs in a class ac-
tion proceeding, the Houles, to provide litigation funding. The Houles sought 
an order of the court approving the litigation funding agreement between the 
Houles, Bentham, and class counsel. The funding agreement stipulated that 
Bentham would pay (a) all disbursements of class counsel up to a maximum 
amount (after which class counsel would fund the disbursements), (b) any 
costs assessed against the Houles, (c) any security for costs, and (d) 50% of 
the reasonable docketed time of class counsel up to a prescribed maximum
amount (after which class counsel would only be paid by contingency fee). 
The funding agreement stipulated that while the Houles and class counsel 
60. Id. at 13.
61. Id. at 14–18.
62. Dugal v. Manulife Fin. Corp., 2011 ONSC 1785, ¶ 33 (Can.).
63. Houle v. St. Jude Med. Inc., 2017 ONSC 5129 (Can.).
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were required to keep Bentham regularly informed about the action, Ben-
tham was not permitted to interfere with or interject itself into the lawyer–
client relationship between the Houles and class counsel. It also stipulated 
that Bentham may not be provided with information or documentation if 
such disclosure would jeopardize privilege.
In exchange for providing funding, Bentham was entitled to receive a 
portion of the proceeds of a successful action as follows: (a) if the action 
settled or was otherwise resolved within eighteen months after the funding 
agreement’s execution, 20% of the proceeds were payable to Bentham; (b) 
if the action settled or was otherwise resolved between eighteen and thirty-
six months from the funding agreement’s execution, 22.5% of the proceeds 
were payable to Bentham; and (c) if the action settled or was otherwise re-
solved after thirty-six months from the funding agreement’s execution, 25% 
of the proceeds were payable to Bentham. In addition, the funding agreement 
provided that the class counsel would be entitled to 10%, 11.5%, or 13%,
respectively, of the proceeds if the action was resolved within the 
timeframes set out above.64
In discussing the merits of the funding agreement, the court acknowl-
edged that the funding agreement was necessary for the Houles to proceed 
with their action given their financial position and was sufficient to achieve 
the goals of the class action regime and the administration of justice.65 How-
ever, the court pointed out several issues with the funding agreement. First, 
it did not satisfy the principle that the litigation funder not be overcompen-
sated which can indicate that an agreement is champertous. The court noted 
that Bentham’s recovery was uncapped and its eventual recovery could be 
unfair and disproportionate because its recovery could not be adjusted by 
court approval. To resolve this issue the court proposed making 10% of the 
recovery pre-approved, with the remainder subject to court approval.66 The 
court also expressed concern that the funding agreement, although contain-
ing provisions purporting to ensure lack of interference by Bentham in the 
litigation proceedings, did not effectively do so. The court indicated that its 
approval of the funding agreement would be subject to deletion and replace-
ment of such provisions. In addition, the court also indicated that the termi-
nation provisions also interfered with the Houles’ litigation autonomy by 
providing Bentham with broad discretionary rights to terminate the agree-
ment, the solution for which was to require that termination be made subject 
64. Id. ¶ 32–33.
65. Id. ¶ 76, 79.
66. Id. ¶ 80, 84–87.
2018] A CANADIAN LENS ON AMERICAN BANKRUPTCY 645
to court approval.67 Ultimately, the court approved the funding agreement 
subject to the revisions discussed above. It should be noted that Bentham has 
sought leave to appeal this decision with respect to the rejected portions of 
the funding agreement.
The decision in Houle, and the other recent Canadian case law regard-
ing TPLF, indicates that Canadian courts take a balanced approach to TPLF 
in that they recognize the importance of TPLF as a source of access to justice 
for litigants and a tool for the administration of justice, but continue to scru-
tinize funding agreements on a case-by-case basis to ensure that such agree-
ments do not jeopardize plaintiff autonomy or reach the point of becoming 
champertous. Given the level of court scrutiny, less regulatory oversight of 
the TPLF industry may be required. We acknowledge, however, that in the 
bankruptcy and insolvency context particularly, litigation funding agree-
ments are often entered into under the radar, that is without court scrutiny, 
and thus regulatory oversight may be required to capture these transactions.
Like in Canada, TPLF is still emerging in the United States. Particularly 
given the minimal level of U.S. court consideration and scrutiny of litigation 
funding agreements to this point, the TPLF industry in the United States may 
benefit from a legal and regulatory framework to ensure that the industry 
develops in a way that promotes the benefits of TPLF while also protecting 
litigants. Such a framework needs to balance the protection of litigants and 
the legal system with the commercial realities of the TPLF; such a frame-
work cannot make compliance so burdensome that the United States be-
comes an unattractive market for litigation funders to operate. The reality, 
however, is that in states where the doctrines of maintenance and champerty 
are still strictly enforced, this discussion of regulation is unnecessary as liti-
gation funders are effectively barred from operating in such states.
There are two key ways in which the TPLF industry can be regulated: 
through the courts and through regulatory or licensing requirements. TPLF 
arrangements can be regulated by the courts by way of requiring the courts 
to approve all TPLF agreements at the outset. Such a requirement would en-
sure that the benefits and drawbacks of a TPLF arrangement are considered 
on a case-by-case basis. However, this method presumes that all litigation 
proceedings go to court, which is far from the case. In addition, this method 
would add to an already overburdened court system.68
The second way of regulating the TPLF industry is by the introduction 
of regulatory or licensing requirements. This can be done by regulating TPLF 
67. Id. ¶ 89–93, 96–98.
68. Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 15.
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arrangements or by regulating the litigation funders themselves. Govern-
ments could regulate TPLF arrangements by legislating certain requirements 
for TPLF agreements, such as a cap on the fees or percentage that a litigation 
funder could charge, stipulating what types of termination provisions are per-
mitted and a requirement for standard non-disclosure provisions to protec-
tion litigants’ confidentiality and claims of privilege. This would ensure that
TPLF arrangements meet some sort of baseline test, which would add a 
consumer protection measure for less sophisticated litigants.69
Regulation of the TPLF industry can also be done by placing regulatory 
or licensing requirements on litigation funders themselves and providing an 
effective means of enforcement. One commentator suggested that the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission could regulate litigation funders in the
United States by requiring them to register as investment advisors.70 Two of 
the benefits of such a registration requirement are that (a) litigation funders 
would be subject to SEC rules requiring them to maintain compliance, pri-
vacy, ethics, funding, disclosure, and management policies, and (b) the SEC 
has a well-established regulatory framework adept at data collection, con-
sumer protection, and compliance enforcement. Thus, in requiring litigation 
funders to register as investment advisors with the SEC, the consumer pro-
tection element of the regulation of the TPLF industry would certainly be 
achieved as there would be clear requirements in place for litigation fun-
ders and effective enforcement of such requirements. However, such a 
registration requirement would result in litigation funders being considered 
fiduciaries required to act in the best interests of their clients.71 A fiduciary 
duty seems too significant of a burden to place on litigation funders. Such a 
duty is generally reserved for those in positions of trust, such as those who
are managing the money or assets of another.
In the case of litigation funders, they are simply extending funds to the 
litigant for expenses. If in compliance with the principles noted in the case 
law, the litigation funder has no control over the direction of the litigation. It 
seems unreasonable to expect litigation funders to abstain from participating 
in the litigation that they are funding but then place a fiduciary duty on them. 
An ideal licensing framework would ensure that the benefits of SEC regis-
tration that we discussed (requirement for the implementation of policies and 
procedures which would protect litigation) exist while not overburdening lit-
igation funders with legal duties.
69. Id. at 16–18.
70. Glickman, supra note 1, at 1066–67.
71. Id. at 1067.
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As we have previously suggested in the Canadian context, it would be 
prudent for state governments and the federal government to commence a 
public consultation process on the regulation of TPLF to gather feedback 
from members of the TPLF industry and from the legal community.72 They 
are inextricably linked and TPLF cannot exist in the legal system unless it 
works in a balanced and equitable manner for litigation funders, litigants, 
lawyers, and the courts.
VI. CONCLUSION
The United States provide a unique challenge for the successful adop-
tion of TPLF in that individual states pose restrictions to the adoption of this 
emerging litigation funding model. TPLF’s success in Australia is indicative 
of the potential to address concerns of access to justice for vulnerable popu-
lations. While ethical and legal concerns, namely qualms surrounding main-
taining privilege as well as influence on the litigation, persist, benefits of this 
funding model offer an innovative solution to age-old issues such as case 
management and expedited processes. The benefits of TPLF, however, are 
counter-acted by a lack of regulation present in the United States. The insol-
vency context presents an ideal terrain for TPFL to expand and overcome 
potential ethical and legal concerns.
This Article has offered two major recommendations to expand the use 
of TPLF into the U.S. insolvency context. As seen in the Canadian context, 
courts have accepted the use of litigation funding agreements fitting within 
certain parameters. If U.S. courts follow suit, friction against the implemen-
tation of TPLF can be mitigated. Alternatively, regulation may occur through 
legislative and regulatory models to govern and set out precisely what types 
of arrangements are permitted. Involving entities such as the SEC may ex-
pedite the acceptance of TPLF, but special attention is necessary not to in-
termingle notions of fiduciaries into the discussion of TPLF, as there are 
contentious definitional elements present. Ultimately, a framework wherein 
regulation coupled with judicial oversight presents the best opportunity for 
the United States to adopt TPLF in the insolvency context to ensure maxi-
mum delivery of benefits to vulnerable parties.
72. Ben-Ishai & Uza, supra note 51, at 17–18.
